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FOREWORD
Conventional security threats have receded in
Latin America since the end of the Cold War, but
unconventional threats—namely organized crime,
drug trafficking, and their attendant violence—have
come to the forefront of the regional agenda. In this
monograph, Dr. Hal Brands examines the evolving
regional security landscape by exploring the relationship between crime, violence, and state institutions
in Guatemala. That country is afflicted by the actions
of a wide range of criminal groups, and its current
predicament demonstrates the profoundly corrosive
effect that crime can have on public security and democratic governance. It also shows how weak government institutions, embedded poverty and corruption,
and other structural factors stand in the way of any
lasting resolution to this crisis. As a result, tackling
the challenge of insecurity in Guatemala will require
patient, holistic efforts that address root causes as well
as symptoms.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph, which it hopes will inform the evolving debate over regional security and unconventional
threats in Latin America.
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
In numerous Latin American countries, organized
crime and violence are corroding governance and
imperiling democratic legitimacy. This phenomenon
is most severe in Guatemala, which is currently experiencing a full-blown crisis of the democratic state.
An unholy trinity of criminal elements—international
drug traffickers, domestically based organized crime
syndicates, and youth gangs—have dramatically expanded their operations since the 1990s, and are effectively waging a form of irregular warfare against
government institutions.
The effects of this campaign have been dramatic.
The police, the judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal infiltrators;
murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in
recent years; criminal operatives brazenly assassinate
government officials and troublesome members of
the political class; and broad swaths of territory are
now effectively under the control of criminal groups.
Guatemala’s weak institutions have been unable to
contain this violence, leading to growing civic disillusion and causing marked erosion in the authority
and legitimacy of the state. This problem cannot be
addressed through police measures alone; combating
it will require a holistic strategy that combines robust
enforcement and security measures with sustained efforts to broaden socio-economic opportunities, combat corruption, and, above all, to build a stronger and
more capable state.
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CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE CRISIS
IN GUATEMALA:
A CASE STUDY IN THE EROSION
OF THE STATE
Across Latin America, the state is under attack.
During the Cold War, the region was roiled by political bloodshed and left-wing insurgencies; today, the
threat emanates from the actions of organized crime
syndicates, extremely violent youth gangs, and international drug cartels. From Tijuana, Mexico, to Sao
Paulo, Brazil, these groups participate in illicit activities ranging from drug smuggling to arms dealing to
simple extortion, they use bribery and coercion to hollow out state institutions from within, and they murder policemen, government officials, and citizens who
refuse to cooperate. These tactics have had a devastating impact on governance; in the slums of Brazil,
cities in Northern Mexico, and elsewhere, the formal
state has effectively collapsed and real power lies with
the predominant gang or cartel rather than with the
authorities. Latin American leaders have struggled to
respond to this challenge, and across the region, crime
is driving down confidence in government, corroding fragile democratic structures, and compromising
the authority—and thus the legitimacy—of the state.
In effect, criminal elements are waging a form of irregular warfare against Latin American states, with
profoundly pernicious consequences.
Recent U.S. attention to these issues has focused primarily on the narco-violence that has raged in Mexico
since 2006. Yet it is probably in the comparatively ig1

nored country to Mexico’s south—Guatemala—where
the situation is most severe. Always a weak state with
a fragmented society, Guatemala is now reeling from
the activities of an unholy trinity of criminal organizations—drug-trafficking outfits like Mexico’s Sinaloa
Cartel and Los Zetas, “hidden powers” composed of
well-placed, corrupt Guatemalans, and transnational
gangs such as the notorious Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS13). These groups significantly expanded their influence amid the disarray following a 3-decade civil war.
They are now well-armed, well-funded, and their actions have become increasingly detrimental to public
order. They have blatantly bribed and intimidated
government officials to the point that the police, the
judiciary, and entire local and departmental governments are rife with criminal collaborators and infiltrators. Murder statistics have surpassed civil-war levels in recent years, and criminal operatives brazenly
assassinate government officials and troublesome
members of the political class. Starved of resources
and riddled with corruption, Guatemala’s state institutions have been unable to reverse or even contain
this violence, and from marginal barrios in the capital
to desolate stretches of Petén, large swaths of territory
are now effectively under the control of drug traffickers, youth gangs, or other criminal groups.
Indeed, rampant crime is causing the breakdown
of democratic governance and a marked erosion of
the Guatemalan state. Guatemalan institutions have
always been relatively feeble, but the continuing
wave of crime now poses an acute challenge to the
credibility and authority of the government. This is
apparent in purely territorial terms, as the influence
of nonstate criminal actors rivals or exceeds that of
the government in up to 40 percent of the country. It
2

is apparent in institutional terms, as criminal groups
have colonized sectors of the government and turned
the state to their own purposes. It is happening at a
psychological level, as well. With the government unable to suppress criminal activity, Guatemalans are
becoming increasingly skeptical that the current system can provide them with basic human security. This
doubt is leading to diminished faith in democracy,
giving voice to latent authoritarian sentiments, and in
many areas, causing a descent into simple vigilantism.
Guatemala is not experiencing a simple problem with
crime; it is immersed in a full-blown crisis of the democratic state. Unless the Guatemalan government and
its foreign partners—including the United States—can
address this challenge and redress the country’s deepseated institutional deficiencies, the region may soon
be confronted with a lawless narco-state at the top of
the Central American isthmus.
This monograph examines the relationship between organized crime, internal violence, and institutional failure in Guatemala. It aims to increase awareness of this growing threat to regional security and to
provide a granular, textured case study of a phenomenon that, while most striking in Guatemala, is present throughout Latin America as a whole. Organizationally, the monograph comprises three substantive
sections. The first, offers an overview of the emerging
security environment in Latin America, examining
organized crime as a form of irregular warfare. The
second, zooms in on Guatemala, exploring the origins,
nature, and effects of the current crisis in that country.
The third, considers the implications for Guatemalan
and U.S. policy.
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THE REGIONAL CONTEXT:
ORGANIZED CRIME AND IRREGULAR
WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA
Since independence, Latin America has experienced relatively little interstate conflict and comparatively high levels of intrastate violence. Many of the
same factors that have made international wars so
rare—namely, underdeveloped state capacity and
deep socio-economic and ethnic cleavages within
Latin American countries—have also conduced to a
striking propensity for violent internal strife. Virtually every Latin American state has experienced insurgency, political revolt, civil war, or other forms of
political bloodshed, as well as less ideological—but
no less harmful—tumults in the form of rampant
banditry, brigandage, and criminal violence. In some
cases, these internal conflicts have taken on the destructiveness of major international wars. During the
Cold War, for instance, long-standing social, political,
and economic strains mixed with the ideological polarization produced by superpower rivalry to generate torrential bloodshed in Guatemala, El Salvador,
Peru, Colombia, and elsewhere. The worst of these
conflicts (those in Guatemala and Colombia) claimed
around 200,000 lives each, wrecked economic capacity
and government institutions, and set Latin American
countries back by years, if not decades.1
The end of the Cold War brought down the curtain
on many of these insurgencies, but it did not bring
an end to internal violence and upheaval in Latin
America. Over the last 3 decades, an array of criminal
groups—notably international drug traffickers, violent
youth gangs, and organized crime syndicates—have
4

largely replaced Marxist rebels as the chief purveyors
of disorder. Across the region, these groups have exploited weak institutions, official corruption, porous
borders, poverty and social alienation, and the easy
availability of small arms to expand their operations
dramatically. They have carved out nodes in a variety of illicit activities—drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms dealing, kidnapping, robbery, extortion,
money laundering, and others—and made insecurity
a fact of life for Latin Americans. Latin America regularly competes for the title of most violent region in
the world (in terms of homicides), and its youth murder rate was more than twice that of any other region
in 2008. In some Central American countries, violence
is approaching levels last seen during the civil wars
of the 1970s and 1980s. Even where murder levels are
lower, violence and crime have driven down economic activity and fostered widespread fear, making life
miserable for much of the population.2
There is no single model of organized crime in
Latin America. Some of the groups responsible for
this turmoil are relatively small street gangs involved
mainly in petty robbery, small-scale extortion, drug
trafficking, and the occasional murder for hire. At
the other end of the spectrum are the sophisticated,
multitiered organizations that operate in several cities or even countries. These groups—gangs like MS13 in Central America and the First Capital Command
(PCC) in Brazil, as well as paramilitary groups like
Los Zetas in Mexico—contain hundreds, thousands, or
even tens of thousands of members organized into numerous cells and overseen by a centralized hierarchy.
They employ individuals ranging from hit-men to accountants and lawyers, and they occupy key nodes in
the illicit networks described above. With different di5

visions and subdivisions responsible for intelligence,
assassinations, money laundering, drug trafficking,
recruitment, and other activities, these organizations
resemble corporations rather than simple street gangs.
These groups also stand out for their propensity to
attack state institutions. They bribe police and judicial
officials, fund candidates for public office, and infiltrate their supporters into the civil service. Government officials who refuse to be bribed or intimidated
are brutally murdered. In Mexico, the decapitation of
policemen has become common, and the killing of public servants is a problem throughout Latin America. In
some areas, the violence has become so intense—and
government institutions so compromised—that these
criminal groups, rather than the authorities, have become the true arbiters of internal order. In Sao Paulo,
for instance, the PCC collects “taxes” through extortion, provides “services” (protection, food, clothing,
and money) to loyal residents, “punishes” those who
challenge their authority, and effectively denies the
police access to large swaths of territory. In essence,
the PCC has substituted its own governance for that
of the state.3
Where this is the case, illicit activity in Latin America begins to straddle the demarcation between nonpolitical and political violence, between crime and
insurgency. To be sure, groups like MS-13, the Zetas,
and the PCC bear little resemblance to the Marxist
insurgencies of the Cold War era. Their motives are
usually pecuniary rather than political (though the
situation is somewhat murky in a few instances), and
these organizations have shown little interest in overthrowing governments and assuming formal political
power. But in countries like El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, and Mexico, violence has reached near6

civil war proportions, indicating something more
profound than a simple police problem. While drug
traffickers, youth gangs, and organized crime syndicates generally lack the coherent ideological or political program often associated with an insurgency,
they have weakened the state, established a form of
dominance over parts of the population, and thus had
many of the same effects as an insurgency.4
This blurring of the line between traditional definitions of conflict has given rise to an updated analytical
vocabulary among scholars and policy experts. Some
observers classify Latin America’s more advanced
criminal groups as “third-generation gangs,” arguing
that they distinguish themselves from less sophisticated groups (first and second-generation gangs) by
their transnational nature and propensity to corrode
the performance and authority of the state. In the
same vein, other analysts describe criminal activity as
a “new urban insurgency,” one that aims, not to overthrow established governments, but to take control
of a city, one neighborhood—or even one block—at a
time. While these definitions bear further elaboration
and refinement, they do underscore the gravity of the
challenge confronting Latin American governments.5
Indeed, from a purely analytical (as opposed to a
normative) perspective, it may well be that many Latin American countries are beset by a form of irregular
warfare. The 2007 Joint Operating Concept defines
irregular warfare (IW) as “a violent struggle among
state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant populations.” IW favors “indirect
and asymmetric approaches,” and frequently involves
groups—transnational criminal enterprises, insurgents, terrorists—that use innovative, unconventional
tactics to overwhelm a stronger foe. As a result, IW
7

resides in the gray area between accepted typologies
of conflict. It is a “complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous
social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean,
neat, concise, or precise definition.” While some analysts might object to the use of military vocabulary to
describe criminal activity, this description—with all
the nuance and even ambiguity it implies—is wellsuited to the recent course of events in numerous Latin
American countries.6
Because of this complexity, defending against irregular adversaries can be very difficult. It requires
the threatened government to synchronize police and
military programs, and to combine these securityoriented initiatives with a variety of additional projects—including social reform, institution-building,
and economic development—aimed at ameliorating
the conditions that allow irregular adversaries to
thrive.7 These tasks are daunting under any conditions,
and can be especially so in Latin America. Given that
Latin American armies have historically been turned
against the citizenry, there is often strong resistance
to involving the military in domestic security matters,
even when the police are clearly overwhelmed. Poverty, social alienation, and large youth demographic
bulges conspire to make gang membership or other
forms of crime attractive to many Latin American
youths. Corruption and the weakness of government
institutions—problems that pervade Latin America as
well as much of the developing world—undermine
the state’s countermeasures and pose major obstacles
to deploying a coherent, effective response along all
necessary axes.8
As a result, Latin American governments have so
far struggled to address the phenomenon of “criminal insurgency,” and the trends seem to be worsen8

ing in several countries. In Mexico, drug cartels and
well-armed paramilitary groups are waging a war
of attrition against the government and against one
another, and the resulting “narco-insurgency” has
claimed roughly 15,000 lives over the past 3 years. The
government has deployed 40,000 soldiers in an effort
to restore order, but official corruption, the advanced
capabilities of groups like Los Zetas, and entrenched
poverty and state weakness have greatly reduced the
force of this offensive.9 In Brazil, the PCC dominates
the slums of Sao Paulo and occasionally advertises its
ability to throw the entire city into chaos. In May 2006,
5 days of PCC attacks against public buildings, private
businesses, policemen, and even civilians resulted in
dozens of deaths, caused millions of dollars in damage, and brought life in South America’s largest city
to a standstill. As one Brazilian security official put it,
“The sad reality is that the state is now the prisoner of
the PCC.”10
Recent upheaval in these countries—particularly
Mexico—has refocused the gaze of the U.S. policy
community on issues of narco-trafficking, criminal
violence, and institutional weakness in Latin America. Yet it is in Guatemala—a country that has received
much less attention from the media and policy analysts—where the challenge to internal order is most
profound, the difficulties in confronting this violence
most vexing, and the prospects for the breakdown
of the state most real. Since the close of its civil war
in 1996, rampant criminal activity has made Guatemala arguably the most dangerous country in Latin
America. Murders increased by more than 120 percent
from 1999 to 2006, with the murder rate in Guatemala
City reaching an astounding 108 per 100,000 inhabitants (compared to a world average of less than 9 per
9

100,000).11 In 2008, Guatemala suffered a reported
6,200 total murders, giving it a higher per capita incidence than Colombia and Mexico.12 According to
the 2008 Latinobarómetro report, perceptions of citizen
insecurity are worse in Guatemala than anywhere
else in the region, and President Álvaro Colom has
remarked that “it’s more violent now than during the
war.”13 From Petén in the north, to Huehuetenango in
the west, to parts of Guatemala City itself, as much as
40 percent of Guatemalan territory is either subject to
dispute or effectively beyond the control of the police
and the central government.14 Additionally, organized
crime has so infested many state institutions as to render them virtually worthless. In 2007, then-Vice President Eduardo Stein acknowledged that criminal elements controlled six of Guatemala’s 22 departments
(the largest geographical and political subdivisions of
the country) and had a strong presence in at least three
others.15 Guatemala’s descent into chaos has been quieter, slower, and less remarked upon than events in
Mexico or other Latin American countries, but it has
probably been more devastating. As Colom put it in
2008, “Guatemala’s security is dying in an intensive
care room.”16
Colom should know. During a bloody election
campaign in 2007, dozens of candidates and their
supporters were murdered and assassination rumors
swirled around Colom. For fear of being ambushed,
Colom chose to travel by helicopter rather than car and
maintained the company of a doctor skilled in treating
gunshot injuries. Due to concerns about poisoning, he
also had to exercise extreme caution in choosing what
to eat. Colom eventually made it into office unscathed,
but reminders of the country’s vulnerability were omnipresent. At one rally, Colom threw a dove in the air
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to symbolize his desire for peace. In a moment that
seemed thoroughly emblematic of the country’s predicament, the bird failed to take flight and went crashing into the ground.17
THE CRISIS IN GUATEMALA: ORIGINS,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND EFFECTS
The contemporary crisis in Guatemala reflects a
confluence of relatively recent trends and longer-running patterns. At the deepest level, domestic instability is rooted in the same historical factors—namely, a
weak state and the socio-economic exclusion of broad
segments of the population—that have traditionally
left much of Latin America prone to internal upheaval.
Like many of its neighbors, Guatemala has often had
an authoritarian state, but it has never had a strong or
effective state. Rugged geography limits the reach of
the central government, and the resistance of powerful
elites has kept tax revenues low. This insufficiency of
tax revenue, in turn, has prevented the development
of capable state institutions that could provide basic
public goods like education, justice, and security. At
the same time, the poverty, inequality, and popular
marginalization characteristic of Guatemalan society
have created simmering resentments and the potential
for violence. Over the past 2 centuries, this toxic combination of factors has subjected Guatemala to recurring cycles of instability and disorder.18
The worst of these convulsions was the civil war
that ravaged the country from 1960 to 1996. Violence
involving leftist guerrillas, right-wing death squads,
and government forces took 200,000 lives (out of a
population base of less than 10 million), with perhaps
half of those deaths occurring in a 2-year period be11

tween 1981 and 1983. (The intensity of this bloodshed
was unmatched in Cold War-era Latin America. In
comparison, El Salvador lost around 75,000 inhabitants during its civil war, and while Colombia suffered
roughly 200,000 deaths during la violencia in the 1940s
and 1950s, these losses came out of a much larger population base.) The scorched-earth policy pursued by
the Guatemalan government devastated much of the
countryside, and guerrilla attacks took a severe toll on
infrastructure and economic productivity. Over 400
villages simply disappeared during the bloodiest days
of the counterinsurgency in the early 1980s, and the unstinting violence of the period left a legacy of mistrust
between many social groups and the government. As
recently as 2005, for instance, indigenous Guatemalans (who bore the brunt of the counterinsurgency)
refused the army’s help after devastating floods and
mudslides. The Cold War was a time of insurgency
and civil war throughout Latin America, but nowhere
were the traumas as shattering as in Guatemala.19
These traumas, in turn, left Guatemala immensely
vulnerable to a post-conflict resurgence of internal
disorder. While war has sometimes catalyzed the formation of a stronger state, in Guatemala’s case the
internal conflict left social, economic, and political
wreckage that has directly abetted the current crisis.
The civil war left the country strewn with weapons
and created a large pool of young men with little education and few marketable skills other than the ability to handle a gun. It initiated destabilizing refugee
flows, and led to the growth of a predatory military
elite skilled in corruption and intimidation. Just as
important, the civil war exposed many Guatemalans
to horrific bloodshed as a way of life, and fueled lasting disenchantment with often repressive govern12

ment institutions. As U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) officials have written, “There
exists a widespread acceptance in Guatemala that violence is an acceptable means of resolving conflict and
Guatemalans do not have faith in the state’s ability
to provide anything other than partial and arbitrary
justice.” Peace accords signed in 1996 were intended
to address these issues, but promised socio-economic
reforms have never been carried out, and the decision
to slash the size and mission of the security services—
while necessary to convince the Left to sign onto the
accords—weakened the only institutions capable of
maintaining some semblance of domestic order. The
civil war magnified the longstanding shortcomings of
the Guatemalan state, leaving the field to opportunistic elements that would prey upon that weakness.20
The resulting potential for instability has been
greatly compounded by relatively recent shifts in the
inter-American drug trade. While Guatemala has long
been involved in poppy production, its prominence in
the cocaine trade has increased steadily of late. Beginning in the late 1980s, U.S. interdiction programs in
the Caribbean forced Colombian traffickers to route
cocaine shipments through Central America en route
to Mexico and the United States. Located roughly
halfway between Colombia and the United States,
possessing a largely uncontrolled border with Mexico
and frontage on both the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, and characterized by rough terrain that
impedes effective government surveillance, Guatemala soon became a primary way station for Andean
cocaine. The amount of cocaine transiting the country
has grown exponentially over the last 2 decades, and
jumped by 47 percent between 2006 and 2008 alone.
U.S. officials estimate that between 180 and 400 met13

ric tons of cocaine transit Guatemala per year, and the
value of this trade may be $10 billion annually. As the
Guatemalan drug trade has grown larger, it has also
grown more violent, with numerous entities competing for control of the profits. A weak state prone to
disorder and violence has now become a focal point
of the international drug trade, creating lucrative opportunities for a wide range of criminal elements.21
International Drug traffickers.
Three principal types of criminal organizations
are currently active in Guatemala. The first group is
composed of international narcotics traffickers. As
Guatemala has taken center stage in the inter-American drug trade, its territory, coastline, and waterways
have become thoroughfares used by a variety of major drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). During the
1980s, Colombian cartels dominated the Guatemalan
drug trade, often cooperating with corrupt military
officials to move cocaine, marijuana, and heroin shipments northward. After these organizations—particularly the Calí and Medellín cartels—were dismantled
in the early 1990s, Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel stepped into
the void. Sinaloan preeminence lasted for more than a
decade, but since 2005, Los Zetas (a rival Mexican organization) have begun to assert their own claim to the
Guatemalan drug trade. The Zetas are moving south
in part to extend greater control over their supply network, and in part to find sanctuary at a time when the
Mexican government has launched an all-out offensive against the DTOs. According to one official in the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Zetas
are seeking to “reach out into Guatemala, extend their
operation into Guatemala, and take over the Guatema14

la corridor.” They compete with smaller Guatemalan
traffickers as well as larger international syndicates,
and Guatemala is now experiencing a multi-sided, violent struggle over drug routes and profits.22
These DTOs use a variety of methods for moving
drugs through Guatemala. At the lowest level of sophistication, “mules” carry drugs through commercial
airports and border crossings, and large shipments
are often simply driven across Guatemala’s borders in
trucks or other vehicles. Alternatively, South American narcotics arrive at ports like Puerto Quetzal and
Puerto Barrios via commercial shipping lines, or are
moved by small, “go-fast” boats that traverse Guatemala’s coastal seas and inland waterways. Another
common conveyance is the small airplane. In remote
rural areas, traffickers have set up makeshift runways
(often just a clearing in the natural vegetation) where
drug-bearing planes can deposit their cargo for the
overland journey across the Mexican border. In some
cases, the planes are reused; in others, they are simply
abandoned. According to U.S. officials, there are more
than 490 clandestine airstrips in Guatemala. One former official who had recently flown over the Petén reported seeing “numerous makeshift strips and dozens
upon dozens of wrecks scattered over the wilderness.”23
As these statistics indicate, the drug trade and its
by-products are pervasive in Guatemala. In rural areas of Huehuetenango and Petén, traffickers are accumulating (by purchase, if possible, and by violence,
if necessary) privately held properties to be used as
safe havens and depots for drugs and arms. The DTOs
are also a major source of employment. They pay poor
laborers to clear land that can be used for clandestine
airstrips, and provide cash and protection to small
farmers who cultivate poppy. Narco-money suffuses
15

the entire economy. Much of the perhaps $10 billion in
drug money that flows through Guatemala each year
is laundered through local banks, business ventures,
and public investment projects. The result is an odd
combination of poverty and drug-funded excess. The
small town of La Reforma in eastern Guatemala has
no bank or grocery store, for instance, and most of the
population can hardly meet their own basic needs. Yet
the town boasts a “first-rate hospital and handful of
mansions,” apparently paid for with profits earned
from the narcotics trade.24
Immense drug profits invariably bring about a rise
in official corruption, and Guatemala is no exception.
One observer estimates that roughly $1 billion of the
drug money that flows through Guatemala each year
is used to bribe government officials.25 This estimate
is probably high, but the DTOs have certainly purchased the loyalties—or at least the acquiescence—of
officials at all levels of government. According to the
U.S. State Department, “money from the drug trade
has woven itself into the fiber of Guatemalan law enforcement and justice institutions.”26 The cartels pay
small-town mayors for the right to set up clandestine
airstrips, and bribe judges, police commanders, military officials, and border guards to avoid government
surveillance or prosecution. Much of this bribery
takes place at the local level, in remote areas where
drug trafficking is heaviest and state institutions are
weakest. As the Guatemalan ambassador to Mexico
concedes, “The co-optation of local power by organized crime in some regions of Guatemala is a fact.”27
In the past several years, the DTOs have become even
more ambitious, paying off members of the Congress
and recent presidential administrations. In September
2008, Colom fired two top aides (Carlos Quintanilla,
16

the Secretary for Presidential Security and Administrative Affairs, and Gustavo Solano, the head of the
Strategic Analysis Secretariat) for allegedly helping
the DTOs place listening devices in the president’s
residence and office. According to Stratfor, “All executive orders regarding Guatemala’s fight against drug
trafficking must now be considered compromised.”28
Where plata (money) cannot co-opt the authorities,
plomo (lead) is used to batter them into submission.
Local and state officials who decline to participate in
narcotics trafficking have been murdered, often in brutal fashion. DTO operatives are also believed to have
been behind a recent assassination attempt against the
governor of the Petén.29 While political murders often go unsolved, it is widely suspected that the DTOs
played a central role in the violence that marred the
2007 election campaign. In the run-up to the vote,
seven congressional deputies and dozens of other
candidates and their supporters were murdered—in
a few cases, after being kidnapped and tortured. The
purpose of this bloodshed was to eliminate politicians
thought to be hostile to a certain DTO, show the rest of
the political class the price of opposing the drug trade,
and thereby neutralize any political will to confront
the traffickers. “Controlling the political system is
their goal,” says one Guatemalan analyst.30
The violence attending the drug trade has escalated amid the intensifying competition for dominance
in Guatemala. The Zetas ruthlessly target their competitors as well as officials thought to support rival
DTOs; the Sinaloa cartel and several Guatemalan organizations have responded in kind. In March 2008, a
firefight in Zacapa between the Zetas and Guatemalan
traffickers claimed 11 lives. Several months later, another shootout involving the Zetas, this time in Hue17

huetenango, left 17 dead. According to press reports,
the fighting was so intense that police and military
units elected to wait for the combatants to exhaust
themselves before moving in to restore order. That
same month, 15 innocent bus passengers were killed
in a nighttime attack that bore all the markings of a
drug-related massacre. “When there becomes a misunderstanding of sorts,” says a DEA official, “they’re
going to resolve it one way, and that’s by physically
removing their competition.”31
While the Zetas are hardly the only culprit in this
bloodshed, their arrival bodes especially ill for Guatemala. The Zetas were initially formed by Mexican
special-forces deserters, and many members have
advanced training in intelligence, counterinsurgency,
ambushes, complex assaults, and other techniques.
The group is renowned for its brutality, often beheading its opponents and, in a tactic apparently borrowed
from Iraqi insurgents, posting torture and execution
videos on the Internet. As George Grayson comments,
“Even mentioning the word ‘Zeta’ conjures images of
castrations, decapitations, and immersion in vats of
lye.”32 The Zetas use a variety of heavy weapons, including AR-15s, AK-47s, MP-5s, improvised explosive
devices, 50-caliber machine guns, grenade launchers,
and bazookas. Thanks to their military training, they
wield these arms with devastating efficacy. As two
writers for Stratfor note, “Assault rifles in the hands
of untrained thugs are dangerous, but if those same
rifles are placed in the hands of highly trained special
forces soldiers who can operate as a fire team, they can
be overwhelmingly powerful.”33
These capabilities have allowed the Zetas to turn
much of northern Mexico into what one DEA official
calls “somewhere between Al Capone’s Chicago and
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an outright war,” and the group has advanced rapidly
into Guatemala as well.34 As of mid-2009, the group
had an estimated 300-400 operatives in Guatemala,
and Zeta operations have increased in frequency and
effect. In April 2009, Zetas ambushed police carrying
out an anti-drug raid, killing five officers. They subsequently made a successful escape from the scene, leaving behind an astonishing amount of firepower. The
group has established training camps, arms depots,
and drug caches in the regions that border Mexico,
and Guatemalan officials estimate that the Zetas have
a presence in 75 percent of the country.35 “They are all
over,” says a DEA official. All this has led Guatemalan officials to complain that “we are being Mexicanized.”36
Hidden Powers.
The international DTOs both cooperate and compete with domestically based organized crime syndicates known as poderes ocultos, or hidden powers.
These groups are deeply rooted in the Guatemalan
political system. According to a detailed investigation
by the Washington Office on Latin America, the hidden powers are “networks of powerful individuals in
Guatemala who use their positions and contacts in the
public and private sectors both to enrich themselves
from illegal activities and to protect themselves from
prosecution for crimes they commit.” They are made
up of prominent businessmen, current and former
military officers, politicians, civil servants, and defense and law enforcement officials—in other words,
they are part and parcel of Guatemala’s elite. These
individuals use their influence to carve out shares in
a variety of illicit networks: drug trafficking, bribery,
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kickbacks, diversion of customs duties, illegal contracting practices, illicit resource extraction, extortion,
human trafficking, kidnapping, car theft, and others.
In some cases, they mix these illicit activities with licit
dealings in the formal economy, such as involvement
in the mining and oil industries. While most poderes
ocultos are relatively informal, protean networks, others have evolved into quasi-corporate entities that
feature “hierarchical leadership structure, with capital and manpower to run sophisticated enterprises.”
They employ current or former members of the security services to carry out their dirty work, and have
also contracted such tasks to Guatemala’s large youth
gangs (discussed below).37
The hidden powers are an outgrowth of the civil
war. From the 1960s onward, the experience of fighting the violent left led to the formation of tight-knit
military fraternities among officers who rose through
the ranks together. At the same time, the fact that the
military effectively dominated Guatemalan affairs for
much of this period encouraged the rise of acquisitive,
praetorian elite. As the army prosecuted a bloody
counterinsurgency against the guerrillas, corrupt officers used their influence and connections to snap
up the best arable land, acquire favorable positions
in mining and industry, divert government funds for
their personal use, and engage in the drug trade and
other illicit activities. These tendencies persisted after
war’s end, as the emergence of a weak democratic
state offered alluring opportunities for corruption and
malfeasance, and as the need to avert any reckoning
with atrocities committed during the conflict encouraged military officers to maintain professional solidarity and seek alliances with other powerful Guatemalans. The military fraternities formed during the civil
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war thus evolved into the poderes ocultos of today. La
Cofradía was originally created by army hard-liners,
and its leaders are thought to include two former generals. El Sindicato contains a contingent of military officers from the class of 1973, and is the chief rival of
La Cofradía. El Archivo was formed by members of the
Presidential General Staff, a group deeply involved in
counterintelligence and electronic surveillance during
the civil war. Other organizations, such as Grupo Salvadidas, have similar pedigrees.38
The hidden powers have an ambiguous relationship with the international DTOs active in Guatemala.
Guatemalan crime syndicates originally provided
transportation and protection for groups like the Zetas (who still employ a few dozen Kaibiles, counterinsurgency specialists who deserted the Guatemalan
army). As the Zetas have become more ambitious,
however, they have targeted any group—Guatemalan or otherwise—that refuses to meet their demands.
The November 2008 firefight in Huehuetenango demonstrated the deteriorating relationship between the
Zetas and Guatemalan organized crime networks, and
a number of recent incidents tell the same story.39
If conflict between the hidden powers and international DTOs has become so intense, it is largely
because their goals are so similar. Like the DTOs, the
hidden powers are determined to weaken the Guatemalan state or—better yet—to control it through corruption. They finance political parties and congressional campaigns in hopes of bringing confederates
to power, and buy off police officials, prison guards,
judges, and other civil servants to assure themselves a
free hand. U.S. officials believe that the hidden powers have particularly strong ties to the Public Ministry,
military intelligence, the judicial system, the National
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Civil Police (PNC), and political parties such as the
Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), which includes
former military dictator Efraín Ríos Montt and exPresident Alfonso Portillo (2000-04). El Archivo and
Grupo Salvavidas were well-represented in Portillo’s
administration, and government attempts to restrain
organized crime were so transparently insincere that
Guatemala was decertified for U.S. counternarcotics aid in 2003. The situation has not much improved
since then. Guatemala has since been recertified for
U.S. aid, but in 2007, Eduardo Stein conceded that organized crime syndicates effectively controlled six of
Guatemala’s departments.40
As with the DTOs, the counterpart to corruption is
violence. The hidden powers maim and murder members of competing organizations and deal roughly
with government officials or civil society groups that
threaten their influence. Organized crime elements
have warned Guatemalan journalists to “shut up and
stop talking,” and human rights activists, members
of the Peasant Unity Committee, and other individuals who oppose the poderes ocultos have been threatened or even lynched.41 Allies of the FRG violently
demonstrated in order to “persuade” the Guatemalan courts to allow Ríos Montt to run for president in
2003. Advocates of greater government and financial
transparency have been kidnapped, and witnesses in
politically charged criminal cases have been killed.42
During the 2007 campaign, the hidden powers apparently competed (or perhaps collaborated) with international DTOs to murder and intimidate potentially
troublesome politicians. According to one account,
the strategy used by the hidden powers was one of
“pruning the field of electoral candidates to guarantee
that the winners stay in line.” In one case, this strategy
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entailed kidnapping, torturing, and executing a candidate’s 14-year old daughter.43
The mixture of corruption and violence perpetrated
by these groups was most pungently demonstrated by
the PARLACEN (Central American Parliament) killings of 2007. In February, three Salvadoran representatives to PARLACEN became separated from their
convoy while traveling through Guatemala. The three
men and their driver were assassinated in what was
apparently a drug-related slaying (the precise motive
remains unclear), their bodies burned and left beside
the road. This crime shocked Salvadorans and Guatemalans alike; even more appalling was the aftermath.
Guatemalan authorities apprehended four policemen
in connection with the slayings, but while the men
were being held prior to trial, they themselves were
murdered. There was no question that these latter killings were abetted by official complicity, as the victims
were being held behind eight sets of locked doors in a
prison near Guatemala City. To top off the whole sordid episode, the judge investigating the killings was
murdered in July 2008, and the alleged mastermind
of the affair was later identified as a former congressional deputy and mayor. The entire affair was deeply
troubling to many Guatemalans, and it laid bare the
extent to which organized crime and its attendant violence had penetrated the country’s institutions.44
Pandillas and Maras.
Extremely violent youth gangs make up the third
major group of criminal elements in Guatemala.
Rampant gang activity has plagued much of Central
America since the 1990s, and Guatemala fits squarely
within this pattern. The most reliable estimates put
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the number of gang members in Guatemala at around
14,000 as of 2006—or just slightly less than the total
size of the Guatemalan army. These individuals belong to hundreds of gangs of widely varying structure
and size. Pandillas are relatively small, flat organizations that operate in a single neighborhood and have
a few dozen members. Maras are larger, more sophisticated groups that can have tens or even thousands
of members spread across several different countries.
They are organized hierarchically, with numerous national cells, or clicas, that report to a centralized gang
leadership.45
The dominant maras in Guatemala are the Mara
Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 (18th Street)
gangs. MS-13 contains roughly 80 percent of gang
members in Guatemala; 18th Street commands the
loyalties of another 15 percent.46 Both gangs have a
strong presence throughout northern Central America and Mexico, and they enjoy working relationships
with various Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers.
MS-13, for example, is thought to be particularly close
to the Sinaloa cartel and its enforcers. These maras also
have tens of thousands of members spread across more
than 40 U.S. states: organized crime analyst Samuel
Logan calls MS-13 “America’s most violent gang.”47
While the various national branches of 18th Street and
MS-13 retain some operational independence, they
are also expected to be responsive to directives issued
by their respective transnational leaderships. In 2007,
a federal grand jury indicted two MS-13 leaders for
allegedly ordering murders in the United States from
their prison cells in El Salvador. MS-13 and 18th Street
are thus far more advanced than simple street gangs;
they are sophisticated transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in their own right.48
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The top-level leaders of these maras are often experienced criminals in their 30s and 40s, but the rankand-file come from a younger demographic. Most
gang members are between 12 and 24 years in age
(although some are far older), and about 90 percent
are male.49 A few of these individuals are sociopaths
who like to commit crimes, but the vast majority joins
gangs for more mundane reasons. Most mareros suffer from poverty, unstable family backgrounds, a lack
of educational, social, or professional outlets, or some
combination of these factors. “They have no realistic
hope of getting anywhere in the modern world,” says
one USAID official, “and they are very much prone to
whatever the streets have to offer them.”50 For marginalized youths, gang membership offers a steady cash
flow, a sense of status and belonging, and, for men,
access to women. Says one expert, “These kids look
at the power the gangs have in terms of the chicks,
the money.” Gang membership also allows these individuals to develop a distinct social identity, as maras
and pandillas have unique hand signals, graffiti, tattoos, and manners of dress. (Tattoos have become less
common of late, as gang members seek to make themselves less obvious to the police.) For disadvantaged
teens and young adults, Guatemalan gangs fulfill an
important—if perverse—social function.51
The gang problem in Guatemala has its origins in
the civil war, when displaced and uneducated—but
often well-armed—young people turned to crime as a
solution to the challenges of demobilization and reconstruction. This phenomenon subsequently received a
major boost from destabilizing refugee flows. During
the 1980s and 1990s, tens of thousands of Guatemalans who fled the violence in their own country settled
in Southern California. Preyed upon by established
25

youth gangs, Guatemalan and other Central American immigrants formed their own gangs, including
18th Street and MS-13. Because the founders of these
gangs had often acquired some military experience
during the civil war, these maras quickly became
some of the most feared criminal organizations in Los
Angeles, and they participated in the Rodney King
riots and other major disturbances during the 1990s.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, U.S. authorities
increasingly deported gang members to Guatemala
and other Central American countries. In the 8 years
after 1996, nearly 500,000 Latin Americans were deported for committing crimes that carried at least a
1-year sentence, and in FY 2006, Guatemala received
around 3,600 criminal deportees. Many deportees
spoke imperfect, anglicized Spanish (or none at all),
lacked economic opportunities in Guatemala, and had
no skills to trade upon other than their criminal proficiency and their gang connections. Consequently, the
gang problem in Guatemala metastasized, with gang
populations swelling over the past ten years and law
enforcement agencies struggling to keep pace.52
Maras and pandillas are at the center of the crime
epidemic afflicting Guatemala. The pandillas focus on
petty extortion, robbery, small-scale drug trafficking,
and occasionally kidnapping and murder. The maras
are involved in all of these activities, and use their international connections to participate in arms smuggling, human trafficking, large-scale car robbery, racketeering, and other organized crimes. They sometimes
aid the larger cartels and poderes ocultos by providing
security for drug shipments, or by distributing cocaine
and other narcotics in the small but growing Guatemalan market. In other cases, they carry out contract
killings for organized crime syndicates.53
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As gang activity has increased, so has violence.
Gangs competing for control of a particular block,
neighborhood, or city attack each other with weapons
as unsophisticated as makeshift knives, as fearsome
as AK-47s and fragmentation grenades. Brutality has
become a form of psychological warfare in these contests, and gang members who fall into the hands of
their opponents are sometimes tortured or dismembered before being killed. This is particularly the case
in Guatemala’s overcrowded prisons, which have
increasingly become central arenas for gang-on-gang
violence. In one instance, gang members decapitated
and burned seven victims in a prison east of Guatemala City.54
The majority of gang violence is directed against rival gangs, but a substantial portion affects the broader
population. The compatriots of a fallen gang member
sometimes take revenge against the entire family of
his or her murderer, and as gang-versus-gang competition has intensified, these organizations frequently
seek to shock the population of a certain area into
submission. One detailed study reports that in 2004,
“initiation into the 18th Street Gang required the rape,
disfiguration, and murder of a young woman.”55 In
many instances, violence against the population is
simply the natural concomitant of gang-related crime.
El Flaco, a member of MS-13 who claims to have killed
22 people, explains the ruthless methods by which the
gang extorts money from affluent Guatemalans. “We
have a saying: If you don’t pay, we won’t hurt the father, sadly, it’s the children who’ll pay,” he explains.
“We send them a letter. Then we surveil their kids.
We ask for $5,000 to $13,000, depending on the kind of
business he’s in. If he doesn’t pay, we kidnap his wife
or a child, and we kill them. Then we send him body
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parts showing him we mean business, and we keep
kidnapping family members until he pays.”56
This approach to extortion is evident in another
favored gang tactic—attacking the heavily used bus
systems in Guatemala City and other urban centers.
The gang that dominates a certain bus route normally
charges around $13 per day for the right to transit the
zone unmolested, and drivers who refuse to pay are
summarily murdered. To reinforce this climate of fear
and intimidation, gang operatives occasionally conduct widespread, simultaneous attacks on transportation infrastructure, as happened in Guatemala City in
early 2009. Overall, 255 bus drivers, and their assistants were murdered nationwide in 2008.57 Though the
extent of gang activities in Guatemala has sometimes
been exaggerated, their brutality and destructiveness
can hardly be disputed.
Violence, Corruption, and the Erosion of the State.
For a country that never fully recovered from the
civil war, the effects of this criminal activity have
been devastating. Economic performance is suffering
because crime deters investment, impedes licit trade,
and diverts both public and private money from development into security initiatives. As early as 1999,
crime cost Guatemalan businesses an average of $5,500
annually, and this amount has probably risen over
the past decade.58 Future economic performance and
social development are also under threat from growing drug consumption, which has spiked as narcotics
saturate the country. About 10 percent of the cocaine
that enters Guatemalan territory is now kept for internal consumption (a high proportion given the small
size of the Guatemalan market), and drugs are easily
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acquired at hotels, bars, and clubs. Drug treatment
centers are filled beyond capacity. Five years ago, one
center in Guatemala City had 20 patients; now it has
to accommodate 250.59
Even more problematic is the overall level of violence. As noted above, homicide rates in Guatemala
are stratospheric. Drawing on data collected by the
United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime, the
Congressional Research Service notes that, along with
El Salvador, Guatemala is “among the most violent
countries for which standardized data has been collected.”60 Citizens and officials lament that the country
is more violent now than during the civil war, and the
numbers bear this assertion out. While recent murder
rates have not approached the levels of violence seen
in 1981-83, homicide totals since 2006 have surpassed
the average number of murders between 1970 and
1996. In numerous areas—not just in remote regions
like Petén and Huehuetenango, but also in marginal
barrios in the capital and other cities—violence is so
intense and criminal organizations are so powerful
that the police can enter only at the sufferance of the
preeminent gang or DTO.61
This rise in violence has been matched by a marked
upsurge in official corruption. Corruption is difficult
to measure precisely, but all serious observers agree
that criminal elements have been hugely successful in
penetrating the security forces, judicial institutions,
and practically every other office or agency charged
with maintaining law and order. DEA officials report
that corruption is rampant at the local level, and in
2007, Guatemalan police chief Erwin Sperisen estimated that 40 percent of the PNC was tarnished.62 This
corruption goes all the way to the top. As mentioned
previously, Colom fired two close advisers on suspi29

cion that they had fed sensitive information to drug
traffickers. The head of the PNC, Porfirio Pérez Paniagua, was recently dismissed on suspicion that he and
more than a dozen subordinates pilfered hundreds
of thousands of dollars and nearly 120 kilograms of
cocaine. Corruption, former Vice-President Stein has
remarked, “is part of a web that includes the National
Civil Police, the Public Ministry, the judicial branch,
the nation’s Justice Department and the penal system.
. . . All the entities here have been penetrated by organized crime.”63
These effects are not lost on Guatemalan officials, and, over the past half-decade, three presidential administrations have deployed various countermeasures. In 2003-04, Portillo launched Plan Escoba
(“Clean Sweep”), an anti-gang offensive that locked
up over one thousand mareros. His successor, Óscar
Berger, sent small groups of Guatemalan soldiers into
the Petén to destroy clandestine runways. In 2007,
the Guatemalan Congress agreed to the creation of
the International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG), a UN-sponsored body charged
with fighting corruption and investigating high-profile crimes.64 The Berger administration bolstered the
PNC by hiring 3,000 army veterans, and, when Colom
was campaigning for president in 2007, he promised
a “zero tolerance” stance toward organized crime and
corruption.65
These measures have permitted some very modest progress in combating criminal activity. In 2008,
the government terminated more than 1,000 corrupt
police officers and eradicated record levels of opium
poppy. Overall, however, the situation in Guatemala
is not much improved, and it may actually be deteriorating. Only one major drug trafficker was arrested in
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2008, and he was quickly released on a technicality.
The gang population is growing, murders continue to
rise, and incidents like the PARLACEN killings and
recent narco-massacres indicate that trends are running in the wrong direction. For all of Colom’s efforts,
violent crime, disorder, and insecurity are still pervasive in Guatemala.66
In some sense, this disappointing outcome owes to
forces beyond Guatemala’s control. Aggressive U.S.
deportation policies have flooded Guatemala with
thousands of criminals each year, and informationsharing on these deportees is limited. Guatemala also
suffers from being located between the world’s chief
producer of cocaine—Colombia—and its chief consumer—the United States. As Interior Minister Francisco José Jimémez put it in 2008, Guatemala is “the
meat in the hamburger.”67
Yet the chief enabler of continuing insecurity in
Guatemala is the fundamental weakness of the state.
Nearly 2 centuries after independence, the Guatemalan government is still incapable of raising revenue,
administering justice, or providing basic public goods.
Because tax rates on individuals and businesses are
low, and tax collection is inefficient, tax revenue remains remarkably low at 10-12 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (the average in Latin America is
18 percent, and developed countries generally collect
tax revenues equivalent to 30-45 percent of GDP).68 As
a result, government institutions are immature and
underdeveloped—shortcomings that are crippling to
even well-intended law and order programs. The prisons are stuffed beyond capacity, making it impossible
to maintain sanitary conditions or even police the
incarcerated population. CICIG is underfunded and
overworked, while oversight of the banking system
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is spotty at best. The situation in the judicial system
is even worse. A dearth of trained prosecutors and
forensic examiners, a lack of modern equipment, and
an unreasonable workload for judges have combined
with other factors to ensure that only 2 percent of
murder cases are ever solved.69
This dynamic is even more pronounced with respect to the police and military. The former institution is chronically underfunded, and, with military
spending amounting to only .33 percent of GDP, it is
hardly surprising that the forces of order are severely
overmatched. The security forces are small—Guatemala has around 20,000 police officers and 15,000
soldiers, compared to at least 14,000 mareros and thousands more DTO and grupo clandestino affiliates—and
completely inadequate to patrol the country’s rough
terrain and porous borders.70 Naval vessels that chug
along at 10 knots can hardly interdict go-fast boats that
reach 50-60 knots, and police side-arms are no match
for the fragmentation grenades, automatic weapons,
armor-piercing ammunition, and rocket launchers
used by organized crime. “These are things we have
only seen in photos of Iraq and the Gulf,” one police
commander laments. As the Zetas establish themselves in Guatemala, this mismatch will only become
more lopsided.71
Of all the factors inhibiting a successful government response, corruption may be the most important. While corruption is ultimately a personal choice,
it also reflects crucial failures of the state: the failure
to offer salaries sufficient to maintain an honest workforce, the failure to provide a climate of security that
will permit honest officials the option of refusing to
work with criminals, the failure to root out corrupt officials from the bureaucracy, and so on. So far, these
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failures have eviscerated the effectiveness of Guatemalan anti-crime initiatives. In the early 2000s, the
Anti-Narcotics Operations Department (DOAN), an
agency created specifically to deal with drug trafficking, had to be shut down after it became known that
its members were involved in crimes including kidnapping and murder. Organized crime elements regularly receive early warning of impending government
raids, and recent reports indicate that security officials
may have helped drug traffickers steal AK-47s and
Uzi submachine guns from military armories.72 CICIG
is far less corrupt than most government institutions,
but its achievements have been limited by the fact that
it has to work through those very institutions. “The
narco nexus may be stronger than the state now,” says
former Deputy Minister of Security Julio César Godoy. “The narcos abuse and kill, and nobody says anything because the judges, prosecutors, military commanders, and governors are all bought off.”73 In these
circumstances, even honest officials have little choice
but to go along with the ethos of corruption that rules
their agencies. As one U.S. official has explained of
the situation in Guatemala: “Prosecutors are reluctant
to vigorously pursue criminal cases because they fear
being compromised at every level. Police officers are
mistrustful of their peers because corruption is pervasive within their ranks. The courts, the prosecutors,
and the police are afraid of compromise, and all are
without mutual support of each other. The result is an
almost complete refusal by any of these three entities
to effectively engage in the counterdrug mission.”74
Finally, the Guatemalan government lacks the resources to address persistent social strains that make
crime such an attractive option for many youths. Because the state is starved of funding, it has long been
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unable to provide decent public education, offer basic
services in poor neighborhoods, or otherwise combat the effects of extreme poverty. While Colom has
spoken to this issue, the Guatemalan political class as
a whole has responded anemically to calls for socioeconomic redistribution or even an expansion of publicly funded educational or social outlets. Funding for
prevention and rehabilitation programs remains inadequate, and while privately and foreign-funded pilot
projects have shown promise, they have not yet been
replicated on a wide enough scale to have a nationwide impact. As a result, enforcement-first initiatives
like Plan Escoba have had only a superficial effect on
the gang problem. In fact, by locking up vulnerable
youths in overcrowded detention facilities where gang
affiliation is crucial to survival, it may have simply reinforced gang loyalties and thereby compounded the
crisis. Institutional weakness and deep-seated socioeconomic problems have long left Guatemala vulnerable to internal upheaval, and these issues now stand
in the way of any lasting solution to that turmoil.75
The government’s failure to provide even a minimal level of domestic security has been profoundly
corrosive to the national psyche. Persistent violence
and unstinting corruption have made Guatemala a
society characterized by fear, cynicism, and mistrust.
Even those who have not been directly victimized by
crime are terrified of its effects. According to a study
conducted by USAID, “86 percent of Guatemalans
surveyed feel that the level of insecurity facing Guatemala presents a threat to the future well-being of
the country, and 45 percent feel that insecurity poses
a threat to their own personal security.”76 There is no
confidence that the government can stem this tide or
even protect those citizens who are brave enough to
34

confront the perpetrators of violence. “There are no
investigations here,” says one Guatemalan. “We think
we know who did it, but everyone is too scared to
say.”77 To many Guatemalans, in fact, the forces of order are not simply ineffective; they are downright malevolent. Only 25 percent of the population believes
that the police can be trusted, and 73 percent of urban
and suburban residents “believe that the police are directly involved in crime.” According to the director of
CICIG, the entire judicial system has been “invaded
by criminal structures” and needs an “exorcism.”78
This disillusion touches on the greatest long-term
threats posed by organized crime in Guatemala—the
degradation of democracy and the erosion of the state.
As the authorities fail to protect the population and
uphold the rule of law, as DTOs and gangs dominate
broad patches of Guatemalan territory, as government
institutions are hollowed out from within—in sum, as
the Guatemalan government fails to meet the basic
requirements of a functioning state—citizens are losing faith in their country’s fragile democracy. Only 28
percent of the population had confidence in Colom’s
government in 2008, and this cynicism extends to
the system as a whole. According to Latinobarómetro,
only 8 percent of Guatemalans think that democracy
works better in their country than in the rest of Latin
America, the lowest figure in the region.79 Former Vice
President Stein concedes, “Democratic governance is
in jeopardy.” Indeed, insecurity and official fecklessness are giving voice to authoritarian sentiments. According to a 2004 USAID study, “Guatemalans that
perceive insecurity in their communities. . . have less
support for the democratic system and the values that
define it. Guatemalans cite crime, along with corruption, as one of their top concerns and high levels of
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crime is cited as the top justification for a military
coup.” Guatemalans are increasingly turning away
from an ineffective democratic state, further depriving it of legitimacy and authority.80
This trend—with all its pernicious consequences—is already well-underway, and is finding clearest
expression in two related phenomena. The first is the
privatization of security. With the police either corrupt
or overmatched, well-to-do Guatemalans are turning
to private security firms for protection. This industry
has flourished of late, and private security personnel—who are often well-armed—now outnumber police by roughly 7.5 to 1. The growth of this industry
has furnished affluent citizens a measure of security,
but it has also reinforced the fact that the state has lost
its monopoly on the use of force. Just as troubling, this
development has merely underscored the suffocating
inequality that suffuses Guatemalan society. The fortunate few can purchase personal safety; the impoverished many cannot. As the state erodes, security is
no longer a public good, but rather a luxury available
only to those of means.81
The second phenomenon is an immensely disturbing trend known as “social cleansing.” Citizens frustrated with the state’s inability to protect them have
taken the logical next step—vigilante violence. Bus
companies, store owners, white-collar professionals,
and others subject to extortion or intimidation now
employ hired thugs to eliminate their tormentors. “Almost every night,” reports the Washington Post, “teams
of gunmen storm into the nation’s poorest neighborhoods to seize another man, woman, or teenager
deemed guilty of wrongdoing. Almost every morning, another corpse turns up showing signs of torture
or strangulation.”82 The perpetrators of these execu36

tions call themselves “Avenging Angels” and “Justice
Makers.” They often wear commando-style uniforms,
and there is mounting evidence that some vigilantes
are off-duty police or military personnel. “We’re helping Guatemala to clean up all this garbage,” says one
vigilante.83 According to one analysis, extrajudicial executions increased by 60-70 percent from 2001 to 2005
(though this may be a conservative estimate), and the
death toll has reached into the hundreds in each of
the past several years. Not surprisingly, many of the
dead are victims of mistaken identity or simple scoresettling. Ominously, this violence—often directed at
residents of poor neighborhoods—has revived memories of the death-squad terror inflicted on much of
the population during the civil war.84 With the state
discredited, Guatemala is descending into vigilantism
and chaos.
This development should be a source of concern to
observers in both the United States and Latin America. The continued destabilization of Guatemala would
provide transnational gangs and DTOs responsible for
a large share of drug trafficking into the United States
with a safe haven and an improved base of operations.
It would impede U.S. counternarcotics operations in
Central America, and make the restoration of order in
Mexico all the more difficult by providing the Zetas
and their rivals with a cross-border sanctuary. Most
troubling of all, the collapse or effective evisceration of
the Guatemalan state would set a troubling precedent
in a region where representative government remains
fragile and countries from Mexico to Brazil are facing the same type of threat from organized crime and
internal violence. Accordingly, the following section
considers options that Guatemalan and U.S. officials
might weigh for addressing this crisis.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The first imperative in dealing with organized
crime in Guatemala is to understand the depth and
complexity of that issue. The current crisis is manifest
in the actions of heavily armed, well-funded, ruthless
criminal organizations, but it is both rooted in and
compounded by a number of powerful, long-running
structural factors. A lack of constructive social outlets
and economic opportunities, heavy drug consumption in the United States and other destination countries (and, more recently, in Guatemala), ubiquitous
official corruption, and the fundamental debility of
Guatemalan state institutions have consistently abetted criminal activities and made this challenge exceptionally difficult.
To view the challenge in Guatemala as simply a
law enforcement problem is thus to attack it in superficial and unproductive fashion. Just as experts
on counterinsurgency and IW emphasize the need to
embed the use of force in a larger scheme of military
and non-military programs, anti-crime initiatives in
Guatemala must address both the symptoms and the
underlying causes of the current unrest. Guatemalan
officials will need to implement a strategy that combines robust enforcement and security measures with
sustained efforts to broaden socio-economic opportunities, combat corruption, and, above all, to build a
stronger and more capable state. Such a strategy must
include a wide range of complementary initiatives:
aggressive, targeted actions against organized crime,
an expansion of educational opportunities and basic
services, overhauling inefficient and outdated institutions, purging corrupt officials, increasing public and
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private investment in communities, and others. So that
government revenues will rise and the rest of these
measures will be possible, strengthening the tax code
and improving tax collection will also be necessary.
Moreover, these initiatives will have to be integrated
into a coherent whole. Economic development and institutional reform cannot occur in a climate of violent
chaos, while, as the recent experience with mano dura
programs in El Salvador and Honduras has shown,
enforcement-oriented programs will accomplish little,
if not partnered with a more holistic approach.85
If this sounds like a daunting task, it is. Grappling
with organized crime and building a more effective
state will require an unprecedented commitment from
Guatemalans of all stripes. Economic elites will have to
pay more taxes and acquiesce to a degree of economic
redistribution, the political class will have to confront
corruption and take social questions seriously, and
the rest of the population will have to overcome its
ingrained cynicism about government motives and
capabilities. Accordingly, a central prerequisite of the
strategy outlined above will be the establishment of
some sort of national compact between the Guatemalan government, the political class, and civil society.
So far, a consensus has been elusive. The well-to-do
have traditionally resisted paying more taxes to a corrupt government, the corrupt have shown little interest in exposing their own transgressions, and the
political system remains polarized and fragmented.
This last problem was on display in early 2009, when
accusations of murder and corruption against Colom
provoked dueling demonstrations by his mostly rural, lower-class supporters and the urban, middle, and
upper-class groups that opposed his election.86
Yet there is reason to hope that this political paral39

ysis may eventually be overcome. Popular frustration
with crime and disorder is on the rise, pushing important sectors of society toward the conclusion that the
costs of a more assertive strategy are worth bearing.
In early 2009, Colom succeeded in getting the Catholic
Church and civil society organizations to approve the
government’s national security agenda, and he wrangled a $1 billion security budget (an increase over the
recent past) out of the Congress. As crime imposes a
rising toll on the private sector, the business class has
clamored for a stronger government response and has
slowly become more receptive to the need for social
investment and poverty-reduction programs. As the
business class moves in this direction, it may gradually pull its political patrons along. In Mexico and Colombia, the current governments have turned popular
anger at persistent internal violence into a political
consensus in support of aggressive government action
coupled with ambitious state-building projects; the task
for Colom and his successors will be to do the same.87
While the impetus for any such strategy must
come from within Guatemala, the United States will
have an important supporting role to play. Various
U.S. agencies have extensive experience in wrestling
with the type of problems now manifest in Guatemala,
and U.S. assistance can serve as a force-multiplier for
Guatemalan initiatives.88 For the most part, this does
not mean starting from scratch. The State Department,
DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USAID,
and other U.S. organizations have long been active in
Guatemala, and in 2008, the U.S. Congress approved
the Merida Initiative, a regional counternarcotics program that includes $6-18 million per year for Guatemala. As part of the same general package, Guatemala
will also receive a roughly equivalent amount in Me40

rida support funds administered by USAID.89
Still, these programs need to be seen as the beginning, rather than the culmination, of U.S. support for security and stability in Guatemala. U.S.
aid to Guatemala actually fell (in both absolute and
real-dollar terms) between 2002 and 2007, and insufficient resources are a problem for nearly every U.S.
program in Guatemala. While the Merida Initiative
will provide a limited infusion of new resources, it is
slated to last just 3 years. This is not a sufficient time
horizon—the current crisis in Guatemala (and in Latin
America more broadly) has taken shape over decades
if not longer, and containing it will also be a lengthy
process. It may thus be necessary for resource levels
to rise modestly. Greatly expanded U.S. assistance is
clearly not feasible given current American commitments and priorities. But devoting an extra $30-40 million per year to U.S. programs in Guatemala would
represent a large proportional increase in U.S. assistance while adding only a small burden to the overall
foreign aid budget. And if this assistance helps head
off a more acute crisis, it will generate long-term savings for the United States.90
Just as the Guatemalan government will need to
combine law enforcement programs, social and economic initiatives, institution-building, and other measures, U.S. policy should emphasize a holistic, integrated approach to combating instability. American
policy should combine sustained, long-term efforts
to address the structural enablers of violence with
more immediate, enforcement-oriented measures that
will produce visible successes and help restore government credibility. Similarly, U.S. officials must be
attuned to the multiplier effect that can result from
coordinated action on several fronts—the way that
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reducing police corruption induces greater community cooperation and thus better intelligence, the way
that enforcement measures against a certain criminal
organization can create space for social and educational projects in a specific neighborhood, and so on.
Finally, with numerous U.S. agencies involved in this
process, it is imperative that American officials forge
a common strategic outlook and make effective use of
existing mechanisms (such as the “Country Team”)
for substantive interagency coordination. This is especially the case with counternarcotics programs, which
involve myriad offices and agencies and continue to
be plagued by a lack of collaboration between participants.91
Within this framework, there are a number of issues that merit particular attention. With respect to security and enforcement, it is crucial to leverage intelligence and law enforcement assets so as to improve the
quality (not necessarily the quantity) of arrests. While
Guatemala has not gone as far as its neighbors in enacting mano dura anti-gang programs, Plan Escoba and
other police initiatives have shown a similar tendency
to scoop up and incarcerate large numbers of suspected gang members. Unfortunately, these sweeps are
neither effective nor resource-efficient. They tax Guatemala’s already-strained police and prison capacities and do little lasting harm to the maras. Most of
the individuals arrested are low-level operatives who
possess few specialized criminal skills and are easily
replaced by the maras or the DTOs.
A more effective approach would be to target
mara and DTO leadership elements, operatives who
possess valuable skills (such as experience in money
laundering or electronic surveillance), and the experienced sicarios (hit-men) who are responsible for much
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of the violence. (This latter category is actually smaller
than one might think; according to one U.S. official,
perhaps 80 percent of murders are committed by 20
percent of murderers.)92 This key player approach
will place a premium on information-sharing, but it
will also entail helping Guatemalan law enforcement
agencies build the capabilities—witness protection, a
greater capacity for wire-tapping and undercover operations—necessary to undertake successful prosecutions against organized crime higher-ups. Similarly,
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would
do well to improve information-sharing on deportees
with gang or criminal backgrounds, as current procedures relay only limited information—sometimes
not made available until the deportee in question has
already arrived in his or her home country—to Guatemala and other recipient nations.
A necessary counterpart to better targeting and
information-sharing will be a redoubled campaign to
attack the financial disadvantage the government currently faces. At present, the PNC is out-gunned by the
criminals because the government is being out-spent
by them. As mentioned above, while Colom obtained
a $1 billion security budget in 2009, the proceeds from
drugs smuggled through Guatemala may be as much
as $10 billion annually. Over the long term, redressing this imbalance will require raising greater tax
revenues and thereby expanding the government’s
resource base. In the short term, it is essential that U.S.
and Guatemalan officials tackle the other side of this
problem by attacking the finances of criminal organizations. In particular, U.S. agencies with experience in
disrupting illicit financial flows can help refine Guatemala’s emerging anti-money laundering laws and
train the personnel to enforce this regime. They can
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also aid Guatemala in developing more effective asset
forfeiture laws (so that the government can avail itself
of resources seized from the cartels) and building a
centralized tracking system to ensure that these assets
do not disappear into the pockets of corrupt officials.
As the State Department recently reported, these measures are central to evening the financial mismatch between the government and organized crime.93
As recent experience has shown, aggressive enforcement strategies will produce desired results only
if carried out by competent, honest officials. Addressing current deficiencies in the PNC and other law enforcement organizations will require thoroughgoing
institutional reform over a long period. In the interim,
it will be necessary to find more immediate ways of
improving police performance, if only at the margins.
High levels of corruption notwithstanding, there are
pockets of trustworthy, courageous Guatemalan security personnel. U.S. policy should seek to identify
these groups, augment their capabilities, and gradually build a core of reliable law enforcement professionals. The United States possesses several tools that
can be useful in this regard: personnel exchanges with
U.S. law enforcement agencies, interaction with police
officers from Washington, DC, Los Angeles, and other cities where community policing techniques have
been used to good effect, and assistance in training
and vetting the small, elite forces that will be needed
to carry out sensitive operations.94
More effective police will need to be supported by
a more effective judicial system. As discussed above,
Guatemala’s institutions are simply too weak at present to support any meaningful law and order program. Corruption, a lack of laws tailored specifically
to fighting organized crime, insufficient training for
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prosecutors and investigators, and even the simple
absence of administrative and physical infrastructure
have rendered the judicial system an embarrassment
and fed public alienation. Redressing these weaknesses will need to be an important part of any comprehensive U.S. assistance strategy. U.S. agencies can
assist the Guatemalan judiciary in developing specific
anti-gang laws, provide training for investigators and
forensic examiners, and offer assistance in developing
effective prosecution strategies. At an administrative
level, USAID should emphasize the development of
personnel and management systems that reward good
performance. The key in all this is to take a buildingblock approach: Start with small, basic tasks that
can form a foundation for more ambitious measures
later on. In some cases, USAID is already involved in
promising pilot programs oriented along these lines.
Cooperation with the Public Ministry has led to more
effective investigative techniques and increased the
number of murder prosecutions in Guatemala City.
The construction of 24-hour courts in Villa Nueva has
helped streamline a notoriously slow judicial process
and ensure that those accused of a crime go before a
judge in timely fashion. Given additional resources, it
may be possible to expand upon these programs and
begin to undertake system-wide initiatives.95
This mixture of selective engagement and institutional reform should form the basis of U.S. policy
toward the Guatemalan military as well. The military
is currently prohibited from participating in domestic policing missions due to its human rights record,
but because the PNC is so often outgunned and overstretched, the armed forces are being tacitly reintegrated into this role. As this happens, it makes sense
for the United States to engage and build the capacity
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of those units involved in interdiction activities (as the
State Department is doing on a limited scale through a
partnership with Guatemala’s Joint Task Force Fuentes), but U.S. offficials should also work to ensure that
Guatemalan military institutions continue to develop
in a way compatible with democratic norms. Over the
past decade, one of the more successful U.S. programs
in Colombia has been to provide financial, technical,
and political support to the office charged with investigating human rights abuses by the military, and a
similar effort may be useful in Guatemala.96
U.S. policy must also address the social conditions
that provide a steady stream of recruits for maras,
pandillas, and other criminal organizations. The need
is not for programs like Plan Escoba, which lock up
Guatemalan youths without offering them any meaningful alternative to gang membership. The need is
to invest in education, vocational training, and afterschool activities that will keep kids off the streets and
give them some hope of succeeding in a licit line of
work. Similarly, it will be necessary to strengthen the
network of organizations and programs that focus on
reintegrating ex-gang members into society and thereby lessening the chances of recidivism.
To its credit, USAID and its partner organizations have been very active in exploring these sorts of
programs. The “Challenge 10” television show (partially funded by USAID) depicted ex-gang members
cooperating to start small businesses, and follow-on
projects placed around 170 former mareros in gainful
employment as of November 2009. Over the past several years, USAID has also worked with rotary clubs,
churches, and other civil society organizations to establish several community centers where Guatemalan
youths can learn to use computers, take classes in a
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trade, or simply hang out. The centers offer community members access to constructive activities, a chance
at self-improvement and, not least of all, a refuge from
the trouble and insecurity that they would otherwise
encounter. They are also extremely cost-effective.
Start-up costs run about $16,000, and because the centers are often based in spaces donated by churches
and rely on volunteers for staffing, they cost just a few
hundred dollars per month to sustain. If this sort of
initiative can be partnered with expanded educational
opportunities, it can provide young Guatemalans with
an alternative to gang membership and crime.97
As the Challenge 10 and community center programs illustrate, the social and economic aspects of
Guatemala’s crime problem are best addressed not
through direct resource transfers from U.S. agencies to
poor Guatemalans, but by emphasizing public-private
partnerships that encourage communities to invest in
themselves. Mobilizing private business, the churches, and other civil society groups entails a number of
benefits: it brings additional resources (both financial
and human) to bear on the problem, taps into social
networks that can provide young people with means
of emotional support outside of the gangs, and fosters
a shared sense of purpose between the government
and important groups of citizens. Accordingly, facilitating these partnerships should be a key aspect of
U.S. policy, especially given the resource constraints
that prevail in Guatemala.
If American officials are serious about combating
insecurity in Guatemala, they must also face up to
the reality that a large chunk of the money that funds
organized crime in that country (and elsewhere in
Latin America) comes from the consumption of illegal
narcotics in the United States. Since the unveiling of
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Plan Colombia roughly a decade ago, the increasing
emphasis on combating drug-related violence abroad
has not been matched by sustained, intensive efforts
to deal with the demand side of the equation. Funding
levels for domestic demand restriction activities fell as
a percentage of the U.S. counterdrug budget between
2001 and 2008, the budget for anti-drug advertising
fell by more than half under the Bush administration,
and the approval of the Merida Initiative occurred
concurrent to a $73 million cut in domestic treatment
programs. Outlining a comprehensive demand-side
strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
clear that the United States will need to devote greater
resources, greater political will, and greater creativity
to dealing with its homegrown contributions to narcotrafficking and drug violence in Latin America.98
This list of measures should be considered suggestive rather than definitive or exhaustive. Combating
crime, ameliorating social ills, and correcting institutional decay are far from exact sciences, and a capacity for innovation and adaptation will be vital in addressing these issues. Accordingly, U.S. officials must
remain flexible in dealing with what promises to be a
fluid, dynamic situation. The need is for what Francis
Fukuyama has called the policy “entrepreneur,” the
creative problem solver “willing to experiment with
new approaches, to learn from others, and more important, to abandon initiatives that are not bearing
fruit.”99 As the United States and its partners seek to
deal with the security challenges taking shape in Guatemala and across Latin America, Fukuyama’s exhortation offers a worthy ethos.
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